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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 000181

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/18
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [UG](#) [CG](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: UGANDA/DRC/SUDAN: CHISSANO SUPPORTS CONTINUATION
OF OLT TO COMPLETION

REF: A. 08 KAMPALA 1561
[1](#)B. KAMPALA 7
[1](#)C. 08 KAMPALA 1469
[1](#)D. 08 KAMPALA 1579

Classified By: Ambassador Steven A. Browning for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: UN Special Envoy Joachim Chissano fully supports continued military action against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and is willing to weigh in as needed to ensure the operation is completed, according to Nuno Tomas, the head of Chissano's office in Kampala. Tomas confirmed that Chissano recommended joint military action to Presidents Museveni, Kabila, and Kiir in early December 2008 after LRA leader Joseph Kony failed to sign the Final Peace Agreement (FPA). Chissano remains in touch with the regional leaders and LRA spokesman David Matsanga but does not believe that Matsanga is talking to Kony. During a recent visit to Maputo, Matsanga requested that Chissano call a stakeholders' conference in Kampala, which Chissano refused to do. Chissano is pleased that Museveni met with Sudanese President Bashir at the African Union Summit because he (Chissano) believes that a deal was struck to end Khartoum's support for Kony, which would help Operation Lightening Thunder (OLT) to succeed. Chissano reportedly advised Museveni not/not to end the operation until the LRA leadership is dead or signs the peace deal. He also urged Museveni to be more aggressive on the ground and to not hold back because Uganda fears killing civilians in firefights. Chissano stands by his December statement to the UN Security Council and will keep a low profile unless the regional leaders need him to express more public support for the joint military operations. End Summary.

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ON OLT
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[1](#)2. (C) Nuno Tomas, the head of the UN Special Envoy's Office in Kampala, told P/E Chief on February 18 that Chissano fully supports continued military operations against the LRA in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). After Kony's failure to sign the FPA on November 30, 2008, Chissano told President Museveni and the diplomatic corps in separate meetings on December 2 that military operations were needed to change the negative dynamic of the peace process (ref A). Museveni then informed Chissano about the plans for joint military operations against the LRA. According to Tomas, Chissano advised Museveni that the operations must be robust and not stop "mid-stream." Chissano said that the LRA leadership must be killed or forced to sign the peace deal. Congolese President Kabila reportedly called Chissano to ask if he should receive Sudanese Vice President Riek Machar and Matsanga, who were making a tour of the region to buy Kony more time. Chissano reportedly told Kabila that he should meet with them and advise that Kony needs to immediately sign the peace deal or call Museveni.

13. (C) Tomas said that Chissano was pleased that his report to the UNSC on December 17 was well-received and that the UNSC issued a supportive statement on December 22 (ref B). Chissano has heard reports that the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) cannot help with logistics support for the Ugandan troops. Chissano believes that the issue can be resolved in DRC at UN Special Representative Alan Doss' level. Tomas said that General Gaye, the MONUC force commander, was ready to assist in the movement of Ugandan troops to protect civilians. Chissano will follow the issue to see if there is a role he can play, if needed, on an extension of MONUC's mandate to allow the ferrying of Ugandan troops. (Note: On February 9, Ugandan Foreign Minister Sam Kutesa told Slobadan Kotevski Didi, the Head of Office of MONUC's that Uganda can provide 2,000 additional troops to protect civilians, but lacked the capacity to transport them. Didi told Kutesa that MONUC's mandate would need to be revised to allow the transport of Ugandan troops. End Note.)

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ON MATSANGA
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14. (C) Chissano continues to listen to Matsanga, but advises him that Kony must call either Chissano or Museveni if he wants a cease-fire to sign the FPA. Matsanga has disavowed peace process mediator Riek Machar because his government is participating in the operations against the LRA and has latched onto Chissano and Tomas. Chissano does not believe that Matsanga is talking to LRA leader Joseph Kony, according to Tomas. Last week, Matsanga traveled to Maputo to see Chissano when he heard that Tomas was headed to Kampala.

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Matsanga reiterated calls for a cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. Matsanga also claimed that Kony was ready to sign the FPA, but would not go to Rikwangba assembly area unless there were 200 troops from South Africa, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Kenya to provide security. Chissano reiterated that Kony must call either himself or President Museveni to discuss these issues. Chissano was stuck with Matsanga's hotel bills after the visit.

15. (C) Matsanga also demanded a stakeholders' conference, similar to the one organized in November 2008 to give Kony one last chance to sign the peace agreement (ref C). Matsanga wants to discuss a cease-fire. Tomas expressed his suspicion that Matsanga and the Diaspora want to use the opportunity to play to the political opposition in Kampala. Tomas advised Chissano against a stakeholders' meeting after a recent trip to Gulu in which the northern leaders involved in the peace process, including Acholi Paramount Chief Rwot Acana, expressed support for the operation against Kony. Tomas found that the only domestic opposition against the operation came from parliamentarian Reagan Okumu and a few members of the Acholi Parliamentary Group. Chissano views Matsanga's request as an attempt to rewrite the history of the events that led to the launching of Operation Lightning Thunder, according to Tomas. Chissano has decided not to travel to the region in March as originally planned, unless Presidents Kabila and Museveni could use his presence at their upcoming summit in Kasese, Uganda to demonstrate his commitment to the operation.

16. (C) Matsanga remains fixated on his December 8 meeting with Museveni, according to Tomas. Matsanga claims that Museveni agreed to provide his personal direct telephone lines to Kony (which Museveni provided during the meeting), pay for the LRA delegation's upkeep (which Museveni did), and not resort to military action against Kony in the wake of his failure to sign the FPA (which Museveni did not say). Ugandan officials deny that Museveni promised the latter (ref D). Nonetheless, Matsanga shamelessly proclaimed to the press that Museveni promised not to attack Kony. Matsanga informed Chissano on December 9 that he had passed Kony Museveni's telephone numbers. Chissano advised Matsanga that

Kony must use them immediately. From December 9-13, Matsanga called Chissano repeatedly with excuses as to why Kony did not call Museveni. On December 13, Matsanga claimed Kony had promised to call Museveni on December 15. Tomas expressed concern that Matsanga's boastful claims of talking to Kony were unfortunate because they had and would continue to have deadly consequences.

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ON SUDAN, ON SUCCESS
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17. (C) Chissano was pleased by the meeting between Museveni and Sudanese President Omar Bashir during the African Union summit, according to Tomas. In 2006, Chissano advised Museveni that the solution to the LRA problem lay in Khartoum during his first meeting with Museveni after being named UN Special Envoy. According to Tomas, Chissano told Museveni that the sooner Uganda reached an understanding on the LRA with Sudan, the easier it would be to resolve the problem. Tomas said that he heard that Museveni approached Bashir at the summit and offered him a solution to the pending International Criminal Court indictment. Museveni allegedly told Bashir that African heads of state could form a committee to investigate the ICC's claims. The two leaders also discussed the fate of Joseph Kony, according to Chissano's information. Bashir allegedly agreed to ensure that there would be no lifeline for Kony from Khartoum if Museveni lobbied other heads of state to find ways to counter the ICC indictment. (Note: We have heard similar information through other channels. End Note.) Based on this development and Uganda's current positions on the ground, Tomas said that Chissano was confident that OLT would succeed.

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COMMENT
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18. (C) Publicly, UN Special Envoy Chissano stands by his December statement to the UNSC, in which he advocated military action to force the LRA to sign the FPA. Chissano's private views, as relayed by Tomas, indicate that the UN Special Envoy believes that the joint military operation must continue until completion: either the elimination of the LRA leadership or a signature on the FPA.
BROWNING